Ponzi schemes follow a similar trend: promise unusually high returns within shortest time, referral bonuses, aggressive recruitment. The architects eventually disappear with everyone else’s funds.
Many Ugandans have fallen for this play. In 2022, losses associated with scheme aptly named BLQ Football were reported at about UGX 60 billion. In 2023, Uganda Police reported that victims of another scheme, Capital Chicken, lost UGX 5 billion after being promised returns of between 40 and 60 percent.
Now, reports show more Ugandans lost money in schemes such as Fidelity Forex Trading and Hut 8. The scale of losses is yet to be determined.
This reveals a deeper economic problem. Ugandans are not necessarily unable to invest. The amounts lost in such schemes suggest that some households have investable funds and strong demand for high-return opportunities. The difficulty lies in where to invest these savings.
This is also reflected in Uganda’s formal investment market. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) reported that assets managed through Collective Investment Schemes had reached approximately UGX 6.02 trillion by March 2026 (CMA, 2026). The growth of regulated investments alongside the continued popularity of fraudulent schemes suggests that Uganda’s challenge is not simply mobilising capital. It is about redirecting available household savings towards credible and productive investments.
The consequences of Ponzi schemes extend beyond individual victims. At household level, losses destroy accumulated wealth. Money that could have financed education, housing, businesses, productive assets disappear. Affected households may consequently reduce consumption, borrow to recover their losses or sell productive assets.
Although the public is repeatedly warned against unlicensed schemes and encouraged investors to verify whether providers are authorised, fraudulent investment platforms continue to attract participants. Over time, repeated losses may make households suspicious not only of fraudulent schemes but also of legitimate capital-market products, thereby discouraging savings mobilisation and financial-market development.
If these schemes continue unchecked, Uganda risks losing more than household savings. Persistent losses can reduce resources available for domestic investment, weaken public confidence in financial institutions and discourage participation in legitimate capital markets. At household level, they can increase indebtedness and reduce consumption and investment. At the national level, untraceable cross-border transfers can complicate financial surveillance and increase the risk of domestic capital being channelled outside productive economic activity.
Uganda could therefore find itself in a dilemma with a population willing to invest, but substantial private savings repeatedly falling into hands of fraudsters.
The priority should be prevention before losses occur. Uganda should develop a single, highly visible investment-verification platform through which the public can immediately establish whether an investment provider is licensed by CMA, Bank of Uganda or another competent regulator. Banks, telecom companies, mobile-money operators, the Financial Intelligence Authority should strengthen the identification and reporting of suspicious entities collecting funds from the public.
Furthermore, Uganda needs practical financial and investment literacy. The National Financial Inclusion Strategy II (2023–2028) already provides a framework for improving financial capability. This should be translated into targeted programmes in universities, workplaces, diaspora communities and digital platforms, teaching potential investors how to verify licences, assess risk and return, recognise recruitment-driven schemes and identify unrealistic investment promises.
Government and financial institutions should actively promote legitimate investment alternatives rather than focusing only on warnings against fraudulent schemes. Uganda could use approaches like the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) Smartlife Flexi and others, more aggressively promoting Collective Investment Schemes, Treasury bonds and bills, and other regulated products through banks, universities, workplaces, mobile-money platforms, and public financial-literacy campaigns.
The objective should be to make legitimate investment opportunities as visible and accessible as possible.
The author is a graduate intern at Economic Policy Research Centre.
This article was first published in the Daily Monitor on September 7, 2026
